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Transferable Development Rights 
Programs 
“POST-ZONING”? 
Vicki Been & John Infranca† 
INTRODUCTION 
Once described as “the quirkiest and most invisible 
place in all of New York City,”1 the High Line—an elevated 
railroad track that originally ferried animals to the city’s 
meatpacking district—is now a celebrated urban park. It is also 
the centerpiece of the Special West Chelsea District, a rezoning 
that dramatically altered the neighborhood’s built 
environment, enabling the transformation of warehouses and 
meat processing plants into high-end residential and 
commercial spaces.2 This transformation was achieved in part 
through the use of transferable development rights (TDRs). A 
sophisticated TDR program allowed owners of property 
beneath the railway, who were prevented from building 
  
 † Vicki Been, Boxer Family Professor of Law and Director, Furman Center 
for Real Estate and Urban Policy, New York University School of Law. John Infranca, 
Jonathan L. Mechanic/Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson Fellow at the Furman 
Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy, New York University School of Law. The 
authors wish to thank Rohan Jolly and Gabriel Panek for excellent research assistance, 
Adam Eckstein and Alex Derian for preparing our figures, Josiah Madar for his tireless 
work on our broader TDR research project, the participants in the Furman Center 
Brown Bag lunch series for suggestions and provocative questions about TDRs, the 
staff of the Brooklyn Law Review for their careful editing, and the members of the 
Furman Center’s TDR advisory committee: Robert Von Ancken, Joshua Bloodworth, 
Dan Brodsky, Deirdre A. Carson, Robert S. Davis, Donald H. Elliot, Ken Fisher, 
Hyman Kindler, Michael Kwartler, Mark A. Levine, Marvin Mitzner, Joseph B. Rose, 
Carol E. Rosenthal, Robert I. Shapiro, Elise Wagner, and Neil Weisbard. Professor 
Been is grateful to the Filomen D’Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Faculty Research 
Fund for financial support. 
 1 Kenneth T. Jackson, From Rail to Ruin?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2003, at 4.11, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/02/opinion/from-rail-to-ruin.html (“A 
concrete and steel structure two stories above the sidewalk, it is so big that anyone can see 
it, but so nondescript and so much a part of the urban landscape that it mostly goes 
unnoticed.”). For a brief history of the High Line see Meera Subramanian, City Lore, Blasts 
from the Past, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006, at 4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2006/02/05/nyregion/thecity/05high.html.  
 2 See infra notes 65-89 and accompanying text.  
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upward, to transfer some of their unused development rights to 
other sites in the district where development was favored.3  
New York City’s Zoning Resolution, like most zoning 
codes, places restrictions on the number of square feet of floor 
area a developer can construct on an individual property lot.4 In 
certain circumstances, the zoning code permits landowners to 
transfer unused development capacity from their lot to another 
parcel of land, effectively increasing the size of what can be 
built at the receiving site.5 A granting parcel might be 
developed below its maximum capacity for a number of 
reasons: because of a separate regulatory restriction, such as a 
historic preservation ordinance; because the owner has chosen 
not to develop to the full permitted capacity; or because a 
zoning change has given the owner some unused development 
rights, but not enough to justify redeveloping the site. TDR 
programs allow property owners to recoup some of the value of 
unused capacity on their lots through a sale of the unused 
development rights on the private market.6 
A number of transfer programs exist in New York City. 
These include zoning lot mergers, which permit transfers as of 
right (without the requirement of any review or approval 
process) but only between adjacent properties; landmark 
transfers, which allow transfers across a street or intersection, 
subject to certain restrictions and approvals; and a number of 
special district transfer programs, which allow transfers from 
specified granting zones or sites to specified receiving zones, 
usually within the same neighborhood.7 TDRs in New York City 
originally served two central purposes: first, they allowed greater 
flexibility through a zoning lot merger process that operates akin 
  
 3 See infra notes 65-89 and accompanying text (discussing Special West 
Chelsea District TDR program). 
 4 See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, ZONING HANDBOOK 148 (2011) 
[hereinafter ZONING HANDBOOK] (“The floor area ratio is the principal bulk regulation 
controlling the size of buildings. FAR is the ratio of total building floor area to the area 
of its zoning lot.”).  
 5 See David E. Mills, Transferable Development Rights Markets, 7 J. URB. 
ECON. 63, 63-64 (1980). 
 6 See id. at 64 (“[T]he attractiveness of TDR is held to be the equitable 
treatment it affords landowners. Specifically, it avoids arbitrary rationing of gains from 
development associated with direct controls. [T]DRs are assigned on some equitable 
basis and the land market (working within the constraint of whatever direct controls 
may remain) determines the most efficient use for every parcel.”). 
 7 See infra Part I (discussing history and regulatory structure of New York 
City’s TDR programs). 
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to density zoning, and second, they offset the burdens imposed on 
property owners by landmark preservation regulations.8  
TDR programs recently have been used in New York 
City, particularly in the Special West Chelsea District and the 
Special Hudson Yards District, to control the location and 
intensity of new development by carefully designating the 
subdistricts authorized to receive TDRs under various rules.9 
Similarly, the Bloomberg administration’s recent proposal to 
rezone East Midtown would allow developers to purchase 
unused development rights above Grand Central Terminal, a 
landmarked building. Those unused development rights have 
remained unused (for want of a market) since the Supreme 
Court upheld New York City’s Landmark Preservation Act, and 
first confronted the concept of TDRs in 1978.10 The proposed 
East Midtown rezoning could, in theory, create towers that 
would rival the Empire State Building. As it is currently 
structured, however, the proposal would only allow transfers of 
development rights from Grand Central Terminal and other 
landmarks to specific sites where the city wants to encourage 
more intense development.11  
TDR programs with a range of structures12 and purposes 
exist throughout the United States and internationally.13 TDR 
  
 8 See infra Parts I.A (discussing zoning lot mergers) and I.B (discussing 
landmark TDR program). For a definition of “density zoning” see infra note 112 and 
accompanying text. 
 9 TDRs have been used to serve a variety of preservation goals. The New 
York State statute that empowers cities to adopt a TDR program states:  
The purpose of providing for transfer of development rights shall be to protect 
the natural, scenic or agricultural qualities of open lands, to enhance sites 
and areas of special character or special historical, cultural, aesthetic or 
economic interest or value and to enable and encourage flexibility of design 
and careful management of land in recognition of land as a basic and 
valuable natural resource.  
N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-f(2) (McKinney 2012). 
 10 See infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text (discussing proposed East 
Midtown rezoning). 
 11 For preliminary reports on the plan, which is still a work in progress as this 
article went to press, see, for example, Theresa Agovino, City Hall: Supersize Midtown’s East 
Side, 28 CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. 3 (July 8, 2012), available at http://www.crainsnewyork.com/ 
article/20120708/REAL_ESTATE/307089970; Matt Chaban, Faulty Towers: Midtown 
Needs a Makeover, with Twice as Tall Towers, but Can Mayor Bloomberg Get it Right?, 
N.Y. OBSERVER (June 27, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://observer.com/2012/06/faulty-towers-
midtown-needs-a-makeover-but-can-the-bloomberg-administration-get-it-right/?show=all. 
 12 TDR programs differ in how they permit unused capacity at a granting site 
to be transferred and converted into more intense development at a receiving site. 
Some programs convert the preservation of, for example, a certain number of acres of 
farmland into a defined number of development credits. These credits allow for a 
specified amount of additional density at the receiving site, for instance, one additional 
 
438 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:2 
programs outside New York City serve various (and sometimes 
multiple) purposes, including the preservation of historic sites, 
farmland, and environmentally sensitive land; the development 
of affordable housing; and broader urban design and 
revitalization goals.14 As in New York City, these programs 
have become increasingly sophisticated over time, introducing 
new techniques to confront local needs.15  
In this essay, we look primarily at how transferable 
development rights programs in New York City—particularly 
in the Special West Chelsea District, the Hudson Yards District, 
and the proposed East Midtown rezoning—are being substituted 
for the upzonings, density bonuses, and other flexibility devices 
the city has traditionally used to enable added density in a 
particular area. These newer programs make TDRs more 
flexible in some ways, but they also mark a shift away from the 
density zoning reflected in zoning lot mergers, landmark 
transfers, and earlier transfer district concepts.  
We begin, in Part I, by reviewing the basic design of 
New York City’s transferable development rights programs. We 
specifically consider the increasing sophistication of these 
programs and their practice of carefully designating potential 
receiving parcels for the purpose of furthering discrete land use 
  
residential unit for ten acres of preserved farmland. See ARTHUR C. NELSON ET AL., THE 
TDR HANDBOOK 3 (2012). In New York City, the transfer of development rights occur 
on a one-to-one basis, with transfers taking the form of a specific number of square feet 
of floor area. See, e.g., Norman Marcus, Air Rights in New York City: TDR, Zoning Lot 
Merger and the Well-Considered Plan, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 867, 879 (1984) (“To arrive at 
the amount of transferable floor area, the floor area of the existing landmark building 
is subtracted from the floor area that would be allowable if the lot were vacant. Any 
floor area transferred is irrevocably subtracted from the development potential of the 
landmark site.”). 
 13 See NELSON ET AL., supra note 12, 131 (identifying 239 communities in the 
United States with TDR programs); Rick Pruetz & Erica Pruetz, Transfer of 
Development Rights Turns 40, 59 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 3, 3 (2007) (“We know of 181 TDR 
programs in 33 states that have preserved at least 300,000 acres of farmland, natural 
areas, and open space to date.”). 
 14 See NELSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 131-227 (cataloguing and discussing 
TDR programs by purpose); see also MARGARET WALLS & VIRGINIA MCCONNELL, 
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS IN U.S. 
COMMUNITIES (2007), available at http://www.rff.org/rff/News/Features/upload/ 
30347_1.pdf (discussing ten primarily rural and suburban examples of TDR programs). 
Notable TDR programs outside New York City include Montgomery County, 
Maryland’s farmland preservation program, and New Jersey’s Pinelands program. 
Pruetz & Pruetz, supra note 13, at 4; see also Sarah J. Stevenson, Note, Banking on 
TDRs: The Government’s Role as Banker of Transferable Development Rights, 73 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1329, 1347-58 (1998) (discussing TDR programs in New Jersey, 
Montgomery County, and Seattle). 
 15 See NELSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 236-40 (same); Pruetz & Pruetz, supra 
note 13, at 7-9 (discussing new TDR techniques). 
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goals. We also look closely at the regulatory structure of the 
West Chelsea TDR program and at the transfers that have 
occurred since its inception. We then briefly review the recently 
adopted Hudson Yards TDR Program and the Bloomberg 
administration’s latest proposal to use TDRs in a rezoning of 
the area surrounding Grand Central Terminal. In Part II, we 
discuss the conceptual frameworks that legal scholars 
developed in crafting the TDR programs New York City and 
many other jurisdictions across the nation have adopted. With 
those frameworks in mind, in Part III we consider how New 
York City’s TDR programs have shifted toward using TDRs as 
a tool to channel development in service of the city’s goals, 
rather than as a flexibility device for property owners. Finally, 
we consider some of the implications of this shift, arguing that 
it brings various advantages even while it reduces flexibility. 
While the definition of “post-zoning” remains a work in 
progress, TDRs, given their close relationship with traditional 
elements of zoning, are unlikely to qualify under any definition 
of the term. For instance, TDRs derive their structure from 
many basic components of zoning, including floor area ratio 
and the definition of a zoning lot. Indeed, in reviewing the 
creation of New York City’s Theater Subdistrict, Norman 
Marcus—one of the earliest proponents of TDRs and the chief 
legal counsel of New York’s City Planning Commission—sought 
to place the concept “within the framework of traditional 
zoning principles.”16 At the same time, however, the early 
conception of TDR districts as a form of density zoning gave 
TDRs promise as a flexible, market-oriented tool that would 
cap the total density within a district while allowing 
landowners within the district to decide how to allocate it.  
The more recent programs give developers who want to 
use TDRs a greater ability to break out of existing zoning 
constraints and, therefore, to some extent, move TDRs beyond 
traditional zoning. But these programs fall considerably short 
of density zoning and lack the flexibility required to qualify as 
“post-zoning.” Instead, these newer programs are marked by 
  
 16 Michael Kruse, Constructing the Special Theater Subdistrict: Culture, 
Politics, and Economics in the Creation of Transferable Development Rights, 40 URB. 
LAW. 95, 137-39 (2008); see also id. at 130 (“TDRs have been seen as inconsistent with 
traditional principles of zoning and land use regulation.”); Andrew J. Miller, 
Transferable Development Rights in the Constitutional Landscape: Has Penn Central 
Failed to Weather the Storm?, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 459, 510 (1999) (“[TDRs] are a 
flexible market-based tool that can help land planners overcome many of the 
shortcomings associated with traditional zoning practices.”).  
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three important and interrelated features: first, they use 
complex subdistricting designations to determine the location 
of TDR recipient sites and the density permitted on those sites; 
second, they use TDRs as one component of a comprehensive 
rezoning and redevelopment plan; and third, they use 
additional regulations and incentives to strengthen the market 
for these TDRs. In sum, these newer programs enable more 
creative uses of TDRs and more distant transfers, but they 
accomplish these results through complex regulations that 
render TDRs less a mechanism to alleviate zoning’s rigidity than 
simply another tool in service of traditional zoning principles.  
I. TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS PROGRAMS IN 
NEW YORK CITY 
In this first part, we review the purposes and regulatory 
structure of New York City’s various TDR programs and 
highlight crucial distinctions between the programs. This 
review sets the stage for Parts II and III, where we consider 
how these different programs’ features relate to early 
scholarship on TDRs and how they might move TDRs into the 
realm of “post-zoning.”  
A. The Zoning Lot Merger 
The “zoning lot merger” is the “simplest example of 
transferable development rights” in New York City.17 The 
zoning lot is the unit that the city uses to determine a 
structure’s compliance with applicable zoning requirements. 
Often, but not always, a zoning lot is identical in size and 
location to a tax lot, the principal unit of property ownership.18 
Through a zoning lot merger, the owners of separate tax lots 
may merge these lots—for zoning-compliance purposes only—
into a single zoning lot.19 In doing so, these private owners alter 
the unit of zoning control and create a merged zoning lot within 
which they can freely transfer bulk and density between their 
tax lots.20 Buildings remain subject to regulations governing 
  
 17 Marcus, supra note 12, at 870. 
 18 According to the New York City Zoning Handbook, a tax lot “is a parcel of 
land identified with a unique borough, block and lot number for property tax purposes.” 
A zoning lot “is a tract of land comprising a single tax lot or two or more adjacent tax 
lots within a block . . . . [t]he zoning lot is the basic unit for zoning regulations . . . .” 
ZONING HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 149, 156. 
 19 Marcus, supra note 12, at 875-76. 
 20 Id. 
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height, setbacks, and other considerations. Ownership—and its 
attendant rights and duties unrelated to zoning—remains a 
function of the tax lots. 
The city’s Zoning Resolution uses floor area ratio (FAR) 
as the primary land use control. FAR “is the ratio of total 
building floor area to the area of its zoning lot” and determines 
a building’s maximum bulk.21 For example, a building on a 
10,000-square-foot zoning lot, in a zoning district with a 
maximum FAR of five, cannot exceed 50,000 square feet of floor 
area. Figure 1 demonstrates two possible configurations for 
this lot. If the building covered the entire zoning lot, it could 
only be five stories high.22 But, if it covered only half the lot, the 
building could rise to ten stories (as long as there are no 
separate height controls). If a zoning lot is coterminous with 
the owner’s tax lot, the FAR must be used on the tax lot. When 
two zoning lots coterminous with two different tax lots are 
merged to become one zoning lot, however, the parties are able 
to transfer unused FAR between tax lots in the form of a 
specific number of square feet of development rights. 
  
 21 ZONING HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 148. FAR was first developed in New 
York City in 1940 but initially only applied to low-density areas of the city. Note, 
Development Rights Transfer in New York City, 82 YALE L.J. 338, 346 (1972) 
[hereinafter Development Rights]. The real estate industry initially objected to this new 
bulk restriction. Id. at 347. To gain their support, the 1961 resolution included two 
additional changes to offset the effect of the new FAR regulations: first, the availability 
of a bonus of twenty percent of a building’s FAR in exchange for adding a plaza to the 
development, and second, a redefinition of the “zoning lot” to which the FAR would 
apply. Id. at 347-48. The new definition of a zoning lot included any other parcel owned 
by a developer within the same city block. Id. This new definition, by applying the FAR 
limit to the entire zoning lot, allowed for the transfer of bulk from underdeveloped 
buildings to a new development, creating the zoning lot merger. Id. at 348. 
 22 ZONING HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 148. 
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Figure 1: FAR Example 
When the current Zoning Resolution was introduced in 
1961, it did not include a specific mechanism for transferring 
development rights. But the definition of “zoning lot” permitted 
a developer to enter into a long-term lease of contiguous tax 
lots on the same city block and then purchase and shift unused 
development rights from one tax lot to another.23 A long-term 
lease had to be at least fifty years in duration, with an option to 
renew that created a total lease of at least seventy-five years.24 
But the seventy-five-year lease posed potential problems, for 
example, if the lease terminated because a lessee ceased paying 
the rent or the lessor was foreclosed upon.25 These situations 
created uncertainties around the continued use of development 
rights. To alleviate these concerns, a 1977 amendment to the 
Zoning Resolution eliminated the lease requirement.26 
Accordingly, the definition of “zoning lot” now includes a tract 
of land consisting of two or more contiguous tax lots located on 
  
 23 Kruse, supra note 16, at 101; Marcus, supra note 12, at 873-74.  
 24 Marcus, supra note 12, at 873-74 (citing N.Y.C., N.Y., ZONING 
RESOLUTION § 12-10 (1961)). 
 25 Id. at 874. 
 26 David Alan Richards, Downtown Growth Control Through Development 
Rights Transfer, 21 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 435, 468-70 (1986) (discussing 
additional concerns that motivated amendment). 
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a single block, which, at the time of filing for a building permit 
or certificate of occupancy, is treated as one zoning lot for 
purposes of compliance with the Zoning Resolution.27 
B. Landmark Transfers 
New York City introduced a development rights transfer 
program for designated landmarks in 1968.28 The program 
sought to compensate landmark property owners for financial 
losses incurred due to the restrictions imposed by the city’s new 
Landmark Preservation Law.29 It also provided the city with a 
way to protect landmarks and restrict redevelopment without 
paying compensation—an issue of particular concern given 
Manhattan’s high land values.30 Under the program, landmark 
owners may transfer unused development rights not only to 
  
 27 N.Y.C., N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION § 12-10 (2012) (part (d) under definition 
of Zoning Lot); see also Marc Israel & Caroline G. Harris, Higher and Higher, N.Y. L.J., 
Jan. 16, 2007, at 31 (discussing “basic mechanics of development rights deals”). In 
certain zoning districts, the ability to use a zoning lot merger to increase building 
height is restricted by the requirement that a tower occupy some percentage of the 
merged zoning lot. See, e.g., N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION § 23-633(c)(3) (district R10X: 
portion of tower above 85 feet must cover minimum of 33% of zoning lot); id. § 35-
24(d)(3) (district C4X); id. § 81-752(c)(1) (Eighth Avenue Corridor); id. § 82-36(a)(2) 
(Special Lincoln Square District). These restrictions seek to prevent the construction of 
buildings like the Trump World Tower, which obtained development rights from a 
large number of merged zoning lots in order to build a tower that occupied “only 13 
percent of the merged zoning lot.” David W. Dunlap, A Complex Plan’s Aim: Simpler 
Zoning Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2000, at RE1, available at http://query.nytimes.com/ 
gst/fullpage.html?res=940DE4DF133CF933A05752C0A9669C8B63 (“Intended to curtail 
the transfer of development rights, [the ‘packing the bulk’] rule is despised by 
developers.”); David W. Dunlap, Battle Lines Drawn on New Zoning Plan, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 4, 2000, at RE1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/06/04/realestate/battle-
lines-drawn-on-new-zoning-plan.html (“This [requirement] was intended to prevent the 
harvesting of air rights up and down a block and piling them on a single building site, 
as was done at Trump World Tower, which occupies only 13 percent of the merged 
zoning lot.”).  
 28 The provisions governing landmark transfers are found at section 74-79 of 
the New York City Zoning Resolution. See N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION § 74-79. Eligible 
landmarks include Landmarks Preservation Commission designated landmarks. 
except cemeteries, statues, monuments, bridges, or structures within historic districts. 
An “adjacent [zoning] lot” eligible for receiving development rights from a landmark is 
defined as one “contiguous to the lot occupied by the landmark . . . structure, . . . one 
that is across a street and opposite to [such a] lot,” or, if the landmark structure is on a 
corner lot, “one that fronts on the same street intersection as the lot occupied by the 
landmark . . . .” Id. For lots in zoning districts C5-3, C5-5, C6-6, C6-7 or C6-9, an 
adjacent lot can also mean “a lot contiguous or one that is across a street and opposite 
another lot or lots that except for the intervention of streets or street intersections, 
form a series extending to the lot occupied by the landmark . . . .” Id. In this case, all 
such lots must be under common ownership. See id.  
 29 Kruse, supra note 16, at 102. 
 30 Norman Marcus, Mandatory Development Rights Transfer and the Taking 
Clause: The Case of Manhattan’s Tudor City Parks, 24 BUFF. L. REV. 77, 91-92 (1974). 
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other lots on the same block but also to lots directly across a 
street or, if the landmark is at a corner, to any of the other 
corner lots at the same intersection.31 The ability to transfer 
development rights beyond the same block came with a limit on 
the receiving site’s ability to increase its existing FAR. Indeed, 
as originally enacted, a receiving site’s FAR could only be 
increased by twenty percent above the site’s maximum FAR 
before the transfer.32 
The owner of Grand Central Terminal challenged the 
landmark law in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York 
City.33 Penn Central, the terminal’s owner, alleged that the 
landmark regulation constituted an uncompensated taking and 
that its TDRs were inadequate to offset or compensate for the 
restrictions the landmark rules imposed since no purchasers 
existed under the then-existing transfer rules.34 To blunt this 
claim, the Landmark Preservation Commission adopted two 
amendments. The first permitted the transfer of TDRs to “any 
site connected to the landmark through a chain of lots under 
common ownership.”35 The second removed the twenty-percent 
limit on the increase in FAR at a receiving site, but only for 
sites in the highest-density commercial districts.36 
Under Section 74-791 of the current Zoning Resolution, 
the owners of both the landmark seeking to transfer development 
rights and the potential receiving lot must submit an application 
for a special permit in order to make the transfer.37 Zoning lot 
mergers, by contrast, can be executed as of right.38 Moreover, the 
  
 31 Richards, supra note 26, at 447; Stevenson, supra note 14, at 1334-35 
(“[The 1968] amendment was the first example of ‘beyond-the-block’ TDR use, 
drastically changing the concept of, and traditional justifications for, TDRs.”). 
 32 Kruse, supra note 16, at 101 (citing N.Y.C. Planning Comm’n, Rep. CP-
20938, at 876 (1969)); Marcus, supra note 12, at 879 & n.45. 
 33 438 U.S. 104, 107 (1978). 
 34 Kruse, supra note 16, at 102. 
 35 Id.; see also Richards, supra note 26, at 451 (noting that amendment was 
“announced October 7, 1969 (the same day the railroad’s suit was filed)”). 
 36 Richards, supra note 26, at 451. Richards notes that the original landmark 
TDR program was introduced by a Planning Commission statement lauding, among its 
benefits, the city’s ability to obtain “new tax revenues from what was previously 
untaxable.” Id. at 448 (quoting N.Y.C. Planning Comm’n, Minutes 303 (May 1, 1968)). 
He describes the 1969 amendment—which was introduced to allow broader transfers 
from Grand Central and blunt the legal challenge—as “a classic case of spot zoning: an 
amendment enacted solely for the benefit of one landowner which was not in 
accordance with a comprehensive plan.” Id. at 451 (footnote omitted). 
 37 See N.Y.C., N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION § 74-791 (2012). 
 38 See ZONING HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 146 (“A zoning lot merger is the 
joining of two or more adjacent zoning lots into one new zoning lot. Unused 
development rights may be shifted from one lot to another, as-of-right, only through a 
zoning lot merger.”). 
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special permit application is subject to New York City’s Uniform 
Land Use Review Process (ULURP).39 Development rights 
transfers from landmark sites may only be authorized upon the 
City Planning Commission’s finding that the transfer  
will not unduly increase the bulk of any development or enlargement, 
density of population or intensity of use in any block to the detriment 
of the occupants of buildings on the block or nearby blocks, and that 
any disadvantages to the surrounding area . . . will be more than offset 
by the advantages of the landmark’s preservation to the local 
community and the City as a whole[.]40  
Separate provisions in the Zoning Resolution provide additional 
regulations that apply to landmarks in designated areas of the 
city.41  
The “procedures for obtaining approval of a proposed 
[landmark] transfer are complex[,]” to put it mildly.42 In an 
article published just four years after the institution of the 
landmark transfer program, Professor John Costonis argued 
that a number of the program’s characteristics reduce its 
effectiveness as a preservation technique.43 In particular, the 
zoning lot merger provision, which allows transfers as of right, 
  
 39 See id. at 157 (“The Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP) is the 
public review process, mandated by the City Charter, for all proposed zoning map 
amendments, special permits and other actions such as site selections and acquisitions 
for city capital projects and disposition of city property.” (emphasis added)).  
 40 N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION § 74-792(e)(1). The City Planning Commission 
also must find that the program proposed in the transfer application for continuous 
maintenance of the landmark will indeed result in its preservation. Id. § 74-792(e)(2). 
If a government entity (city, state, or federal) owns the landmark, the special permit 
application must include a plan to provide a major improvement to the area’s 
pedestrian circulation or transportation system. Id. § 74-792(e)(3). This requirement 
serves as an exaction levied by the government “upon the private builder who would 
utilize the development rights.” Richards, supra note 26, at 453. 
 41 These include, among others, the Special Midtown District, which imposes 
a maximum FAR for certain zoning lots. See N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION § 81-211; the 
Grand Central Subdistrict, which allows transfers to certain receiving lots without an 
adjacency requirement and transfers of less than one FAR by certification (rather than 
requiring a special permit), see id. §§ 81-63, 81-634; and the Theater Subdistrict, which 
allows more distant transfers via a chain of lots under common ownership, see id. § 81-
747. The transfers allowed under Zoning Resolution section 81-747 are a special form of 
landmark transfer and are permitted in the Theater Subdistrict, yet they are distinct 
from the Special Theater Subdistrict TDR program. Id. Under section 81-747, transfers 
can be made to more distant lots than permitted under the standard landmark TDR 
program, but all intervening lots must be under common ownership. In addition, at 
least one of the intervening lots must be occupied by a “listed theater[]” or by a use that 
directly supports the theater business; a covenant must ensure either future use of this 
type or an improvement to the lot to accommodate pedestrian or vehicular traffic 
generated by theaters. Id.  
 42 John J. Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of 
Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574, 585 (1972) [hereinafter Costonis, The Chicago Plan]. 
 43 Id. at 586-89. 
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renders the landmark transfer program “useful only when a 
developer can be found who happens to own a lot located across 
a street or an intersection from a landmark . . . .”44 Developers 
might also obtain more development rights through a zoning 
lot merger than they can through a landmark transfer, because 
the latter limits the increase in floor area obtainable through 
TDRs (except for transfers in high density commercial districts) 
to twenty percent of the receiving site’s existing FAR.45 Echoing 
these concerns, an American Planning Association publication 
from 1987 noted that in the eighteen years since the creation of 
New York City’s landmark TDR program, only approximately a 
dozen transfers occurred.46 The authors attributed this to 
developers’ access to easier and more attractive methods for 
increasing density, including zoning lot mergers and rezonings 
of the development site.47 Indeed, the Furman Center’s research 
on TDR transactions between 2003 and 2011 identified only 
two transfers through the program during that period.48 
C. Special Transfer Districts 
In addition to zoning lot mergers and landmark 
transfers, New York City has a number of special districts that 
permit more distant transfers of development rights. These 
districts are defined geographic areas where specified granting 
sites are able to transfer development rights to a number of 
eligible receiving lots. The eligible receiving sites are not 
limited to lots on the same block or even across the street from 
the granting site; indeed, eligible receiving sites may be many 
blocks away from a granting site. Hence these programs 
potentially expand the market for both potential sellers and 
buyers of TDRs. 
These special transfer districts include, most notably, the 
South Street Seaport Subdistrict,49 the Theater Subdistrict,50 the 
  
 44 Id. at 586-87. 
 45 N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION § 74-792(b)(4). 
 46 RICHARD J. RODDEWIG & CHERYL A. INGHRAM, AM. PLANNING ASS’N, 
TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS PROGRAMS: TDRS AND THE REAL ESTATE 
MARKETPLACE 8 (1987); see also Richards, supra note 26 at 462 (“[T]o this writer’s 
knowledge, only a dozen [landmark] transfers have been processed in eighteen years . . . .”).  
 47 In conversations with the authors, developers have indicated that because 
of the special permit requirement they simply do not consider it worthwhile to obtain 
development rights through the landmark TDR program. 
 48 Vicki Been, John Infranca & Josiah Madar, The Market for TDRs in New York 
City 18-19 (May 25, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Brooklyn Law Review).  
 49 N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION § 91-60. 
 50 Id. § 81-70. 
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Special West Chelsea District,51 and the Special Hudson Yards 
District.52 The Special Hudson Yards District, which includes a 
complex TDR program,53 is an important component of the city’s 
efforts to encourage development on the west side of Midtown 
Manhattan.54 The city recently announced plans for a proposed 
rezoning of East Midtown, which would also include a complex 
TDR program.55 We discuss several of the special districts below 
in order to explain how the districts operate and demonstrate 
the evolving uses of TDRs.  
1. Theater Subdistrict 
The Theater Subdistrict, a part of the Special Midtown 
District, permits the transfer of development rights from forty-
six “listed theaters,” which are named in the Zoning Resolution 
and include some that are also designated landmarks.56 With a 
few exceptions, the listed theaters may transfer development 
rights to any other lot within the Theater Subdistrict.57 To 
execute a transfer, the City Planning Commission must issue 
either a certification or an authorization, and the owner of the 
granting site must provide written assurances that the site will 
continue to be used as a legitimate theater.58 The theater also 
must be certified as physically and operationally sound, or a 
plan must be in place to upgrade it as necessary for its 
continued use.59 Transfer through certification, which is a 
ministerial process, may increase the maximum floor area at a 
receiving site by no more than twenty percent.60 These transfers 
also require a contribution to the Theater Subdistrict Fund, 
  
 51 Id. § 98-00. 
 52 Id. § 93-00. 
 53 See infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text. 
 54 See East Midtown Study: Overview, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/east_midtown/index.shtml (last visited Sept. 10, 
2012) [hereinafter East Midtown Study]. 
 55 See infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text. 
 56 N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION § 81-742 (providing list of theaters); see also 
Kruse, supra note 16, at 110-11 (noting that some listed theaters are also landmarks).  
 57 N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION § 81-744. 
 58 Id. § 81-743. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. § 81-744(a); see also Kruse, supra note 16, at 115-16 (“[T]he only 
requirement for such transfers beyond the FAR limit was that the [City Planning 
Commission] confirm that (1) the TDRs available to the granting site be reduced once 
the transfer is complete, (2) that the theater owner transferring the TDRs satisfy the 
requirements regarding the continued use of the property as a legitimate theater, and 
(3) that a contribution of ten dollars per square foot of transferred floor area be made to 
the Theater Subdistrict Fund.”). 
448 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:2 
which finances inspection and maintenance of the granting 
theaters.61 Additionally, receiving sites within the Eighth 
Avenue Corridor may use TDRs to gain an additional twenty 
percent of FAR over the amount they can receive through 
certification, subject to the City Planning Commission’s 
authorization of the additional FAR.62 This authorization is 
discretionary and requires findings that the development (i) 
relates harmoniously to all structures and open space in its 
vicinity in terms of scale, location, and access to light and air in 
the area; and (ii) serves to enhance or reinforce the general 
purposes of the Theater Subdistrict.63 To date, eleven transfers 
have occurred through the Special Theater Subdistrict TDR 
program,64 which have involved approximately 450,000 square 
feet of development rights. 
2. Special West Chelsea District 
The Special West Chelsea District, which contains the 
High Line, includes a sophisticated TDR program. The High 
Line opened to rail traffic in 1933, replacing existing at-grade 
train tracks.65 It ran “through the middle of the block between 
10th and 11th Avenues, passing either over or through the 
structures along the way, making deliveries of raw materials, 
milk and meat directly into warehouses or factories that were 
built to allow a train to run through them.”66 As the use of rail 
declined in the post-war period, the High Line fell into disuse 
and carried its last train in 1980.67 In the ensuing years, nature 
reclaimed the elevated tracks, as wildflowers and grasses grew 
amid its decaying structure.68 At the same time, the 
surrounding neighborhood grew in popularity, becoming home 
to nightclubs, art galleries, and restaurants.69  
  
 61 N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION § 81-744(a). The contribution amount is 
adjusted over time, and the rate was adjusted in 2006 to $14.91 per square foot 
transferred. Id. § 81-744.  
 62 Id. § 81-744(b). Because this twenty percent increase also applies to the 
twenty percent obtained by certification, this allows for a total increase of forty-four 
percent above the original FAR at the site. Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Been, Infranca & Madar, supra note 48, at 18-19.  
 65 Jackson, supra note 1. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Editorial, A Plan for the High Line, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2004, at CY.9, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/15/opinion/opinionspecial/highline.html.  
 69 See About: Neighborhood Info, HIGH LINE, http://thehighline.org/about/ 
neighborhood-info (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). 
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In the 1990s, owners of property beneath the elevated 
rails sought to demolish the High Line structure, which would 
have enabled them to redevelop their land.70 Then-Mayor 
Rudolph Giuliani supported these efforts, but a lawsuit 
prevented the city from demolishing the High Line before he 
left office.71 After Michael Bloomberg was elected mayor in 
2001, the city began to support efforts by a group known as 
Friends of the High Line to transform the structure into an 
urban park.72 The property owners below the High Line 
withdrew their opposition in 2004 and in 2005 the federal 
Surface Transportation Board issued a “certificate of interim 
trail use,” permitting the tracks to be removed from the 
national railway grid and enabling the process of transforming 
it into a park to begin.73 
The neighborhood around the High Line soon became 
popular among developers,74 who recognized the High Line’s 
potential as a unique urban amenity.75 In the next few years, 
investors poured an estimated $2 billion into the area 
surrounding the park.76 Although development in the area 
slowed following the downturn in the broader real estate market, 
the market remained strong compared to other neighborhoods.77 
  
 70 Paul Vitello, Rusty Railroad Advances on Road to Pristine Park, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 15, 2005), http://travel.nytimes.com/2005/06/15/nyregion/15highline.html.  
 71 Adam Sternbergh, The High Line: It Brings Good Things to Life, N.Y. 
MAG., Apr. 29, 2007, available at http://nymag.com/news/features/31273/.  
 72 Vitello, supra note 70. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Nicolai Ouroussoff, On the High Line, Solitude is Pretty Crowded, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/24/arts/design/ 
24ouro.html (“[T]he High Line risks being devoured by a string of developments, 
including a dozen or more luxury towers, a new branch of the Whitney Museum of 
American Art and a Standard Hotel.”).  
 75 See Kate Taylor, The High Line, a Pioneer Aloft, Inspires Other Cities to 
Look Up, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2010, at A1 (“Part of the fascination with the High Line, 
which is operated by the city and the nonprofit Friends group, is that it is more than 
just a pretty place. The neighborhoods it runs through—the meatpacking district and 
Chelsea—were already glamorous with many restaurants, bars and art galleries. But the 
opening of the High Line has made those areas even more of a destination and encouraged 
the Whitney Museum of American Art to build a museum there.”); Claire Wilson, Turning 
the High Line into . . . the High Life, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2005, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/18/realestate/18cover.html?pagewanted=all (describing 
the High Line as “[w]hat some say amounts to Manhattan’s biggest land grab since a 
handful of Native Americans took a few beads in trade for the entire borough . . . .”). 
 76 Patrick McGeehan, The High Line Isn’t Just a Sight to See; It’s Also an 
Economic Dynamo, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2011, at A18. 
 77 Alison Gregor, In Signs of New Life, Property Deals Below as a Park Runs 
Above, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2010, at B6. 
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According to owners of real estate along the High Line, the park 
had a clearly positive impact on property values.78 
The regulations that govern the Special West Chelsea 
District restrict development of properties under and 
immediately west of the High Line.79 These properties form a 
“High Line Transfer Corridor” and property owners within this 
“corridor” are authorized to transfer their TDRs.80 The district 
is then further divided into designated subareas, and some of 
these subareas are eligible receiving sites for TDRs. The TDRs 
enable receiving sites to increase their FAR by between 1.0 and 
2.65 FAR, depending upon the subarea.81 In certain subareas, 
developers may also obtain additional FAR by contributing to a 
High Line Improvement Fund or by participating in New York 
City’s Inclusionary Housing Program.82  
Various other regulations encourage transfers and help 
to finance the development of the High Line. For example, 
certain lots must dedicate an easement for an elevator or 
stairwell that will provide access to the High Line in order to 
transfer TDRs.83 Moreover, owners of vacant sites within the 
High Line Transfer Corridor that have already transferred all 
of their development rights may be granted an additional 1.0 
FAR upon contribution of $50 per square foot to the High Line 
Improvement Fund.84 The additional FAR, however, can only be 
used for a commercial purpose within the High Line Transfer 
Corridor. These provisions facilitate the Special West Chelsea 
District’s broader goals of establishing the High Line as a 
vibrant and accessible neighborhood resource.85 But they also 
increase the potential costs of transferring development rights. 
Perhaps as a result, prospective purchasers have complained 
that too few TDRs are available for sale, that sellers initially 
  
 78 Id. 
 79 N.Y.C., N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION §§ 98-11, 98-52 (2012). 
 80 Id. § 98-31. To execute a transfer, owners of the granting and receiving sites 
must provide written notification to the Department of City Planning. Id. § 98-33(a).  
 81 Id. § 98-22 (providing table that sets forth maximum FAR in subareas). In 
some of the subareas, a developer may obtain additional FAR via inclusionary housing 
only after she has obtained the maximum allowable TDRs. This requirement further 
incentivizes the purchase of TDRs. In certain areas, a developer must both purchase 
TDRs and develop inclusionary housing to reach the maximum permitted FAR. Id.  
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. §§ 98-33(d), 98-62.  
 84 Id. § 98-35.  
 85 Id. § 98-00. 
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priced their TDRs too high, and that the program’s regulations 
should allow easier transfers.86  
Despite these complaints, the Furman Center’s citywide 
study of TDRs87 found records of seventeen transfers through 
the Special West Chelsea District program between 2003 and 
2011. These transfers reallocated approximately 273,000 
square feet of development rights.88 Of the forty eligible grantor 
lots in the High Line Transfer Corridor, thirty-three appear to 
have had unused development rights when the program was 
created and thirteen of these have transferred TDRs.89 The 
individual transactions ranged in size from 643 square feet to 
55,991 square feet of transferred development rights. During 
the same period, 157,809 square feet of development rights 
were transferred through eight zoning lot mergers in the area. 
Some of these same development rights were later transferred 
again through the special district TDR program.  
Figure 2 below depicts the TDR transactions that have 
occurred through the Special West Chelsea District program. 
These transfers have shifted unused bulk from under the High 
Line to specific blocks where the city seeks to encourage 
development—most notably at the northern end of the district. 
These northern blocks include the subareas with the highest 
permitted maximum FAR.  
  
 86 See Eliot Brown, Developers Want Easier Access to High Line Air Rights; 
But Should City Fix Something that Doesn’t Look Broken?, N.Y. OBSERVER (Feb. 13, 
2008), http://www.observer.com/2008/developers-want-easier-access-high-line-air-rights-
should-city-fix-something-doesn-t-look-broke (“The Real Estate Board of New York, 
responding to the concerns of multiple developers who were unable to find air rights to 
buy, has asked the city to consider changes to zoning regulations in West Chelsea that 
would allow for an easier transfer of those rights.”); Gregor, supra note 77. 
 87 See Been, Infranca & Madar, supra note 48, at 18-19. 
 88 This represents more than one-third of the approximately 765,000 square 
feet of development rights that we estimate are available for transfer from the eligible 
granting sites. Authors’ conversation with N.Y.C. Dep’t of City Planning (Oct. 2012). 
 89 The thirteen lots that participated are owned by only six parties. In 
addition, only nine parties purchased TDRs. Six of the transfers were for a single 
project, the Avalon West Chelsea, on Block 700. This project used a total of 111,000 
square feet of TDRs. 
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Figure 2: Development rights transfers in the Special West Chelsea 
District90 
3. The Special Hudson Yards District 
The Special Hudson Yards District, located on the west 
side of midtown Manhattan, includes a TDR program designed 
to shape development in specific locations as well as to obtain 
land for a planned public boulevard and park. To compensate 
for restrictions on new development in the area planned for the 
park, known as “Phase 2 Hudson Boulevard and Park,” the 
private owners of property in this area may transfer unused 
development rights by certification to designated subareas 
within the district.91 The prices for these TDRs are determined 
through private negotiations. The designated receiving 
subareas each have a maximum permitted FAR increase,92 
which developers can unlock by purchasing TDRs or by 
  
 90 Compiled from Furman Center analysis of data from the New York City 
Department of Finance’s Automated City Register Information System (ACRIS), the 
New York City Department of City Planning’s PLUTO, and the Department of 
Buildings. See Been, Infranca & Madar, supra note 48, at 16-18. The demolition permit 
data included demolition permits issued between 2003 and 2010. The development 
rights transfer data includes transactions between 2003 and 2011. 
 91 N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION § 93-32.  
 92 See id. §§ 93-21, 93-22 (providing tables specifying allowable FAR increase).  
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contributing to the Hudson Yards District Improvement Fund 
in order to receive a bonus.93  
Purchasers who have “maximized their permitted floor 
area” through either of these two methods may then purchase 
additional development rights from the Eastern Rail Yard.94 
The Eastern Rail Yard will make available at least 4.5 million 
square feet of development rights, which can be transferred to 
a subset of the receiving sites eligible for TDRs from the Phase 
2 grantor sites.95 A prospective purchaser must apply to 
purchase these rights. A pricing policy issued in July 2010 set 
the price at the higher of the current price for the District 
Improvement Fund bonus or sixty percent of the value, per 
square foot of land area, of the receiving property. However, 
the pricing policy is currently being revised and a new policy is 
scheduled for release in April 2013.96  
While the specifics of these special district programs 
differ, the basic elements remain the same: each seeks to 
loosen the restrictions on the transfer of development rights 
within the district in order to further the city’s goal of 
encouraging development in the district’s other areas. Using 
complex subdistrict rules, these newly created districts have 
become increasingly sophisticated at directing the destination 
and use of TDRs. These rules governing receiving areas look 
more like traditional upzonings—albeit using private rather 
than publicly created rights—than attempts to give property 
owners more flexibility within the neighborhood.  
  
 93 Id. § 93-31. The fund will be used to finance infrastructure improvements 
including extension of the subway and new parks and open space. See The Hudson Yards 
Project: Rezoning, HUDSON YARDS DEV. CORP., http://www.hydc.org/html/project/ 
rezoning.shtml (last visited July 17, 2012) [hereinafter Hudson Yards Project: Rezoning]. 
 94 N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION § 93-34.  
 95 See Hudson Yards Project: Rezoning, supra note 93.  
 96 See id. To facilitate the broad Hudson Yards redevelopment, New York 
City created the Hudson Yards Infrastructure Corporation (HYIC) and Hudson Yards 
Development Corporation (HYDC). See About HYDC, HUDSON YARDS DEV. CORP., 
http://www.hydc.org/html/about/about.shtml (last visited Oct. 16, 2012); Mission 
Statement and Performance Measures, HUDSON YARDS INFRASTRUCTURE CORP., 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/hyic/html/about/hyic.shtml (last visited Oct. 16, 2012). HYIC 
acquired a fifty percent share in the TDRs at the Eastern Rail Yards for $200 million, 
which HYIC will recoup through the sale of the TDRs. See HYIC, FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS, YEARS ENDED JUNE 30, 2011 AND 2010, at 3-4, available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/hyic/downloads/pdf/hyic_financial_statements_2011.pdf.  
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4. The Proposed East Midtown Rezoning 
The Bloomberg administration recently proposed a 
rezoning of seventy-eight blocks in East Midtown in an area 
surrounding Grand Central Terminal.97 The proposed rezoning 
seeks to encourage development of more modern office 
buildings in the area, where the average office building is over 
seventy years old. When presenting its proposal, the 
Department of City Planning noted the “limited success” of the 
Grand Central Subdistrict, which was created in 1992 to allow 
for easier transfer of landmark development rights in the area. 
Only one major transfer has occurred through that program 
since its creation, leaving over a million square feet of 
development rights on the site of Grand Central Terminal.98  
Rather than simply upzone the sites where greater 
density will be allowed, the proposal—as described when this 
article went to press—will permit owners of those sites to 
increase maximum FAR as of right. First, owners can receive a 
bonus in exchange for a contribution to the district 
improvement fund,99 which is dedicated to improving 
pedestrian networks and access to subway stations in the area. 
Second, owners can further increase the FAR at a site by 
purchasing landmark TDRs or making an additional 
contribution to the fund.100 A special permit process will allow 
even greater increases in FAR. This process will involve a full 
  
 97 East Midtown Study, supra note 54. The proposal was first mentioned, 
albeit briefly, in Mayor Bloomberg’s 2012 State of the City address. See Matt Chaban, 
The Mayor’s Very Big Plans for Midtown East, N.Y. OBSERVER (Jan. 16, 2012, 3:18 
PM), available at http://observer.com/2012/01/the-mayors-very-big-plans-for-midtown-
east/. In January 2013 the city updated the East Midtown Study presentation. See N.Y.C. 
DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, EAST MIDTOWN STUDY: UPDATE PRESENTATION (Jan. 29, 2013), 
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/east_midtown/presentation_012913.pdf. 
This updated proposal did not alter the structure of the TDR program, but did shrink 
the boundaries of the rezoning slightly, removing portions of three blocks from the 
proposed rezoning. Id. at 15. 
 98 See East Midtown Study, supra note 54. 
 99 As of February 2013, the Department of City Planning was recommending 
that this contribution rate be set at $250 per square foot of development rights. N.Y.C. 
DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, EAST MIDTOWN STUDY: UPDATE PRESENTATION II, at 22 (Feb. 28, 
2013), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/east_midtown/presentation_022813.pdf. 
 100 See Matt Chaban, Actually Developers and the City Are Not Competing for 
Midtown East Development Rights, N.Y. OBSERVER (July 18, 2012, 5:52 PM), 
http://observer.com/2012/07/actually-developers-and-the-city-are-not-competing-for-
midtown-east-development-rights/; Steve Cuozzo, Grand Central’s Grand Plan, N.Y. 
POST (July 17, 2012, 12:50 AM), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/realestate/ 
commercial/grand_central_grand_plan_jPGVKtolNBn7V8YYokal4N/0; see also East 
Midtown Study, supra note 54. 
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Uniform Land Use Review Process (ULURP),101 a design review, 
and the developer’s agreement to create a major public space.102 
II. THE ORIGINAL CONCEPTION OF TRANSFERABLE 
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS  
New York City’s existing TDR programs owe many of 
their features to the legal and conceptual frameworks 
developed in the 1970s and 1980s by legal scholars John 
Costonis,103 Norman Marcus,104 and David Alan Richards.105 
Those scholars viewed TDR programs as a tool to help resolve 
tensions between development and preservation goals. But, 
more broadly, they viewed them as part of a general move 
toward more flexible zoning. They also seemed to view unused 
development potential as a community resource, rather than as 
a solely private one—an idea that shaped their proposals for 
how municipalities could structure the transfer of development 
rights. Because their views were so fundamental to the design 
of TDR programs in New York City and across the country, this 
part explores these theoretical frameworks and considers how 
New York City’s existing TDR programs reflect their ideas.  
A. The Need for Transfer Districts to Correct the Perceived 
Failure of Landmark TDRs  
The desire to preserve resources—such as historic 
landmarks, open space, and farmland—in areas facing 
development pressure has been the principal motivation for 
TDR proposals both in New York City and elsewhere. TDRs 
have been used to alleviate the hardships that development 
restrictions used to preserve those resources impose on their 
owners.106 Mitigating or offsetting regulatory burdens is a 
  
 101 For a description of ULURP, see N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, THE UNIFORM 
LAND USE REVIEW PROCEDURE (ULURP), http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/luproc/ 
ulpro.shtml (Oct. 16, 2012) [hereinafter UNIFORM LAND USE REVIEW PROCEDURE]. 
 102 East Midtown Study, supra note 54. 
 103 See JOHN J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT: SAVING URBAN LANDMARKS 
THROUGH THE CHICAGO PLAN (1974); Costonis, The Chicago Plan, supra note 42; John 
J. Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75 
(1973) [hereinafter Costonis, Development Rights Transfer]. 
 104 See Marcus, supra note 12; Marcus, supra note 30; Norman Marcus, Air 
Rights Transfer in New York City, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 372 (1971).  
 105 See Richards, supra note 26; Development Rights, supra note 21. 
 106 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. TDRs also have been advocated 
as a method for alleviating broader inequities attributed to the vagaries of zoning. On 
this account, Euclidean zoning and land use regulation can impose differing 
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particularly important goal of the landmark and Theater 
Subdistrict TDR programs. At the same time, the perceived 
shortcomings of New York City’s landmark TDR program 
motivated the development of more complex TDR programs. 
Writing in 1972, John Costonis noted that no developers had 
made use of the landmark TDR program adopted four years 
earlier.107 He ascribed the program’s disuse to “[i]nadequate 
analysis of the economic burdens of landmark ownership and of 
the urban design consequences of development rights 
transfers . . . ,” “[o]nerous administrative controls of dubious 
necessity . . . ,” and prospective program participants’ skepticism 
over the program’s legality.108 Costonis attributed the landmark 
TDR program’s “failure” primarily to its adjacency requirement.109  
In response to these perceived deficiencies, Costonis 
proposed a “Chicago Plan,” which would preserve urban 
landmarks through designation of “a ‘development rights 
transfer district,’ an area within which the unused 
development rights of landmark sites could be transferred.”110 
The district would include recipient sites sufficiently close to 
the transferor landmarks to enable the low-density landmarks 
to offset the increased density at recipient sites. The district 
would also encompass an area with a high concentration of 
public services, enabling it to adequately absorb increased 
population and density.111 Costonis described the Chicago Plan 
as “an instance of density zoning, which prescribes a maximum 
  
restrictions on landowners with similar parcels, providing economic benefits to some 
while preventing economic gain by others. See Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer et al., 
Transferable Development Rights and Alternatives After Suitum, 30 URB. LAW. 441, 444 
(1998); see also Miller, supra note 16, at 465 (arguing that TDRs, “by providing 
compensation to landowners whose land value is severely decreased by zoning 
regulation . . . . are simultaneously more equitable and more efficient than traditional 
zoning practices”).  
 107 Costonis, The Chicago Plan, supra note 42, at 577-78. 
 108 Id. at 578. 
 109 Id. at 594 (“It severely impairs the marketability of development rights. It 
scatters density throughout the city on the capricious principle of how closely proposed 
developments border on landmarks.”). 
 110 Costonis, Development Rights Transfer, supra note 103, at 86; see also 
Costonis, The Chicago Plan, supra note 42, at 590. Landmark owners within these 
districts would be allowed to transfer development rights to any other lot within the 
district, but they could only increase the development capacity at a receiving lot by a 
maximum of fifteen percent. See Costonis, The Chicago Plan, supra note 42, at 590. 
Transfers would be accompanied by a requirement that landmark owners maintain the 
landmark in the future. Id. Costonis notes that the fifteen percent figure “was 
concurred in by municipal planners and architects in Chicago who viewed it as low 
enough to protect against the risk of urban design abuse, but not so low as to deprive 
the plan of economic appeal for landmark owners.” Id. at 590 n.55.  
 111 Costonis, Development Rights Transfer, supra note 103, at 86. 
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amount of bulk for an area as a whole and permits developers 
to concentrate or disperse that density on individual lots within 
the area in accordance with flexible site planning criteria.”112 He 
analogized this approach to other forms of density zoning, 
including cluster zoning or planned unit developments, and to 
flexibility devices such as zoning bonuses.113 Each of these 
devices maintains a constant level of overall density while 
simultaneously permitting greater design flexibility.114 Marcus 
also noted these similarities, contending that “[i]f a larger area 
unit of control is acceptable for developments in single 
ownership, it should be equally acceptable where ownership in 
the larger area is fragmented.”115  
Costonis’s Chicago Plan was never adopted, but New 
York City’s special district TDR programs embrace the district-
wide focus that his proposal embodied. The Theater Subdistrict 
is most analogous to density zoning, as it allows the transfer of 
TDRs from the grantor theaters to nearly any other lot within 
the district’s boundaries. By allowing more distant transfers, 
this feature provides prospective TDR grantors with a measure 
of increased flexibility. The program, however, draws the 
boundaries sufficiently narrowly to keep the transfers within 
the same neighborhood, ensuring that the neighborhood where 
additional development is allowed is in close proximity to the 
lower density lot that granted the TDRs.  
These special programs also address Costonis’s concern 
that the landmark TDR program could result in the 
“capricious” scattering of density around the city, based only on 
the proximity of a proposed development to a source of TDRs.116 
This is particularly true of the West Chelsea TDR program and 
the Hudson Yards program, which allow the transfer of TDRs a 
  
 112 Id. at 89. 
 113 Id. at 89, 124; see also Costonis, The Chicago Plan, supra note 42, at 622-
23 (“Virtually every major innovation in the land use field over the last fifteen years 
[including density zoning, special development districts, and development rights 
transfer districts] rejects the notion that individual lots must serve as the unit of 
development control.”). Marcus similarly compares TDRs to other flexible zoning 
mechanisms, including “large scale developments,” planned unit development, and 
cluster development. See Marcus, supra note 30, at 108.  
 114 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES & 
MATERIALS 329-31 (discussing cluster zoning and planned unit developments), 331-36 
(discussing zoning bonuses) (3d ed. 2005).  
 115 Marcus, supra note 30, at 108 (“It could serve the same planning goal—
better development with greater zoning flexibility without increasing density. Perhaps 
most important, the resulting zoning flexibility could provide the framework necessary 
to sustain stringent public regulation of areas of critical concern to the environment, 
such as major public resource areas.”). 
 116 Costonis, The Chicago Plan, supra note 42, at 594. 
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number of blocks away from the grantor site but place a firm 
limit on the maximum amount of FAR that each eligible 
receiving site may obtain. This limit differs depending upon the 
subarea in which a given receiving site is located.117  
B. The Need to Move Away from Lot-by-Lot Development 
Control 
Although the increasing complexity of the city’s special 
transfer districts has moved those districts away from the 
original conception of district-wide density zoning, zoning lot 
mergers continue to function as density zoning at a block level. 
Norman Marcus argued that the choice of the individual lot as 
the traditional unit of development control was arbitrary and 
failed to serve public interests.118 Uniform controls on all lots 
were imposed when growth, rather than preservation, was the 
driving concern of planning. Their goal was “to promote equal 
opportunity by treating large areas according to uniform 
regulations.”119 The emphasis on lot-based zoning, he 
maintained, could impose detrimental uniformity and 
encourage landowners to develop sites that would better serve 
society in other ways.120 He asserted that controls at the block 
level can achieve density goals as readily as lot-level controls.121  
Zoning lot mergers instantiate Marcus’s ideas by 
moving away from lot-based zoning and permitting transfers 
throughout a block. They provide greater flexibility and allow 
private actors to negotiate the distribution of density within a 
block.122 In fact, during the late 1970s, as Marcus and Costonis 
  
 117 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 118 Marcus, supra note 30, at 108. 
 119 Id. 
 120 See id. 
 121 Marcus, supra note 12, at 878 n.40. Marcus did not express the same 
concerns as Costonis regarding the landmark transfer program. He did, however, raise 
concerns regarding the transfer of unused development rights from parcels spaced too 
widely apart. See id. For example, he posited that a transfer between boroughs would 
result in a TDR program “destroy[ing] any zoning plan within which it operates.” Id. 
The concept of regulating density over a broader area, such as a block, is analogous to 
the “bubble” concept in environmental regulation, which allows for polluters to freely 
trade permits “allowing a given number of tons of a pollutant to be emitted or 
discharged in a given air or water basin . . . .” Richard B. Stewart, The Discontents of 
Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Administrative Regulation, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 
655, 684 (1985).  
 122 See supra Part I.A (discussing zoning lot mergers). Shifting density 
controls from the lot level to the block level will not necessarily result in the same 
overall density in the area subject to regulation. Rather than simply shift the location 
of development that would otherwise occur, TDRs have the potential to encourage 
greater actual built density than might occur were transfers not allowed. Richards, supra 
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were writing on TDRs, New York City amended its zoning lot 
merger process in a way that rendered it even more akin to 
density zoning. The 1977 amendment to the Zoning Resolution 
eliminated the requirement that a developer purchase or 
obtain a seventy-five-year lease for any property from which 
TDRs were obtained and thereby eased the transfer of density 
among tax lots on a block.123  
C. Development Rights as a Community Resource 
Costonis asserted that the technique of development 
rights transfer “stands squarely upon a principle that has been 
implicit in American land use practice since the Euclid decision: 
The development potential of privately-held land represents, in 
part, a community asset that government may allocate to 
enhance the general welfare.”124 This position relies in significant 
part on the premise that the government creates much of the 
value in privately held land.125 TDRs, on this account, enable the 
government to recoup some of this value for public use by 
avoiding or discounting potential eminent domain awards.126  
  
note 31, at 437; see also Arik Levinson, Why Oppose TDRs?: Transferable Development 
Rights Can Increase Overall Development, 27 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 283, 293 
(1997) (finding that, in a partial equilibrium model of urban zoning, “total development 
under a TDR system would be higher than under a uniform height rule”). Of course this 
should not be surprising, given that TDR programs are justified in part as a method for 
giving value to development rights that would otherwise go unused.  
 123 See supra note 26. At the same time, under New York’s zoning lot merger 
provision, development rights cannot be freely exchanged between any two lot owners 
within a block. The granting and receiving lots must either be directly adjacent or they 
must obtain the agreement of all intervening lots to enter into a single zoning lot 
merger. If the city wished to grant even greater flexibility to owners of TDRs—moving 
the zoning lot merger process closer to density zoning—it could remove the 
requirement that intervening lots enter into a zoning lot merger. Instead, any two lots 
on a block could be allowed to negotiate a transfer, which would include the placement 
of a permanent restriction on the grantor lot equivalent to the amount of development 
rights transferred. Such a change would remove the limited veto (and concomitant 
strategic bargaining opportunities) afforded to intervening lots by the current zoning 
lot merger process.  
 124 Costonis, Development Rights Transfer, supra note 103, at 85, 127 (“The 
central argument advanced in this article is that the development potential of private 
property is in part a community asset allocable to serve the community’s needs. As 
implemented under development rights transfer this principle vastly expands 
government’s economic and planning leverage over private land use decisions. 
Concomitantly, it places the leadership and administrative burden for resource 
protection more squarely on government’s shoulders.”).  
 125 See id. at 97-98.  
 126 Id. at 99 (“By regarding the development potential of private property as in 
part a community resource, on the other hand, development rights transfer enables 
government to share in the gains occasioned by rising land values. Eminent domain 
awards paid to owners of protected resources will be discounted to eliminate windfalls 
attributable to governmental rather than private initiative. Marginal downward revisions 
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III. ARE NEW YORK CITY’S NEWEST TDR PROGRAMS POST-
ZONING? 
What are planners, land use lawyers, and property 
owners to make of New York City’s newer transferrable 
development rights programs? Are they improving upon a 
promising way of moving beyond the rigidities of traditional 
zoning schemes, or are they burdening what could have been a 
more flexible scheme with the same complexities and 
restrictions that mark traditional zoning ordinances? The 
answers to these questions will vary somewhat depending on the 
TDR program one considers.  
This final part seeks to identify a few key themes 
reflected in the city’s evolving use of TDRs. First, the complex 
subdistricting threatens to undermine the flexibility that TDRs 
promised. Second, narrower definitions and greater restrictions 
on receiving sites have a number of potential virtues: they may 
promote more careful planning of a district’s future 
development, allow more transparent public review of potential 
future development sites, provide greater predictability 
regarding the location and intensity of as-of-right development; 
and serve to standardize the exactions imposed upon 
purchasers. Third, these TDR programs cast new light on long-
standing controversies regarding the value of TDRs and their 
role in providing compensation for development restrictions.127 
The newer programs establish a limited number of receiving 
sites within larger areas typically marked by development 
  
in the development potential of lands within transfer districts will afford the funds 
required by these awards; these revisions will be proportioned to what land economists 
have long regarded as the ‘unearned increment’ in the value of private property.”). 
 127 In Penn Central, Justice Brennan considered TDRs relevant to the 
question of a regulation’s impact and whether it constituted a taking. 438 U.S. 104, 137 
(1978). In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected this view, arguing that TDRs were 
only of relevance to the question of compensation. Id. at 150 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting). This debate continued at the Court in Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 
Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997). There, the petitioner property owner challenged 
development restrictions that included the grant of “certain allegedly valuable 
‘Transferable Development Rights.’” Id. at 728. Focusing on the claim’s ripeness, a 
majority of the Court declined to address the relevance of TDRs to the issues of 
whether a taking had occurred or whether just compensation had been provided. Id. In 
a concurrence, Justice Scalia staked the position that TDRs have no relevance to the 
takings question (and whether the claim is therefore ripe for judicial review) but 
instead simply constituted a form of compensation and should be considered in that 
light. Id. at 747-50 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
Accordingly, Scalia deemed irrelevant the majority’s discussion of whether the 
defendant had reached a final decision on the salability of the TDRs and “whether 
[their] value . . . must be known.” Id. at 745.  
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pressure and a demand for increased density. They then 
require potential developers who seek to achieve maximum 
permitted FAR to purchase TDRs on the private market. In so 
doing, these regulations strengthen the market for these TDRs 
and better ensure that they have a reasonable value. In this 
final part we explore each of these points in turn.  
A. Newer TDR Programs May Be Too Rigid and Complex to 
Qualify as Flexible “Post-Zoning”  
TDRs allow property owners to avoid the strictures of 
existing zoning by buying TDRs on the private market rather 
than seeking regulatory changes that would allow greater 
density on the site. Although the landmark TDR program 
imposes special permitting requirements on the transfers, the 
more recent special district programs allow many transfers to 
be made as of right. This less onerous process is coupled, 
however, with specifications that limit the volume and 
destination of development rights. 
The Special West Chelsea District, for example, allows 
transfers as of right, requiring only that parties submit a 
written notice of intent to transfer. However, the West Chelsea 
District also identified specific sites to which these rights could 
be transferred and placed limits on the number of TDRs a 
receiving site could obtain. These limits are tailored to foster 
an urban form that accords with the general purposes of the 
district, which include “ensur[ing] that the form and use of new 
buildings relates to and enhances neighborhood character and 
the High Line open space” and “creat[ing] and provid[ing] a 
transition to the lower-scale Chelsea Historic District.”128 
Accordingly, although private-market actors are provided some 
flexibility with regard to where TDRs may be moved, this 
freedom is carefully circumscribed within a detailed plan for 
the receiving sites. In some ways, the Special Theater 
Subdistrict, which allows an initial as-of-right transfer to any 
site within a broad geographic area, is more akin to density 
zoning than the Special West Chelsea District.129 However, 
unlike the Special West Chelsea District, a special permit is 
still required for a purchaser to obtain the maximum permitted 
FAR increase at a development site.  
  
 128 N.Y.C., N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION § 98-00(e)-(f) (2012). 
 129 See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text. 
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Unlike earlier forms of TDRs, including the zoning lot 
merger and to some extent the Special Theater Subdistrict, the 
newer programs—particularly West Chelsea and Hudson 
Yards—are more than a form of density zoning that creates a 
space where developers can freely select the location and 
intensity of development. Instead, these programs more carefully 
direct the form and intensity of permissible development in a 
way that reflects the goals (and structure) of more traditional 
zoning. In this sense TDRs have moved away from a simple 
mechanism that permits buyers to escape the strictures of 
existing zoning and toward a complex system of upzonings (and 
downzonings), where the right to develop to the maximum 
permitted FAR depends upon the use of TDRs purchased on 
the private market.130 
B. The More Rigid Regulation of Eligible Receiving Sites 
May Provide Advantages 
Although zoning lot mergers do not alter the total density 
on a block, they leave uncertain precisely where permitted 
density will be situated within a block. Similarly, the Theater 
TDR program allowed development rights to be transferred 
anywhere within the Theater Subdistrict, although it limited the 
permissible increase in FAR at a receiving site. This left the 
likelihood of increased density at any specific site highly 
uncertain, which may have affected the likelihood that neighbors 
would oppose the program.131 Newer TDR programs, by specifying 
both the parcels that can receive TDRs and the amount of FAR 
they can obtain, more carefully constrict the permitted density at 
a parcel. In so doing, they promote greater predictability.132  
  
 130 As noted above, under the proposed East Midtown rezoning, a developer 
can receive additional FAR first through a contribution to a district improvement fund. 
A developer can then gain additional FAR through the purchase of TDRs or through an 
additional contribution to the district improvement fund. See supra note 100 and 
accompanying text. 
 131 This uncertainty most likely reduced opposition. However, it may be that 
the uncertainty over where the TDRs would be deployed increased the likelihood of 
neighborhood opposition because every resident or owner had to worry that the lot next 
door would receive the TDRs. Generally speaking, however, the greater the certainty of 
denser development nearby, the greater the likelihood that neighbors will oppose 
whatever tool is providing that density.  
 132 Norman Marcus argued for the importance of ensuring predictability when 
structuring a TDR program. He emphasized the need to relate TDRs to a “well-
considered plan” and rejected long-distance transfers of development rights due to 
concerns about the potential negative impact on the “predictability and collective 
security” that zoning provides. See Marcus, supra note 12; Norman Marcus, 
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That predictability may affect the nature of the public’s 
participation in debates over proposed TDR programs. Each 
proposal triggers a public review process in which stakeholders 
can present challenges to the proposed changes in allowable 
density. By providing greater specificity about where the TDRs 
may be used, the newer programs give stakeholders a clearer 
understanding of what would be allowed and where.133 That 
clarity likely encourages those property owners and residents 
who live near areas designated as potential recipients of the 
TDRs to participate actively in the public review. Of course, 
these increases remain speculative and, to some extent, less 
likely than they would be if the city were simply to upzone an 
area (given that a developer must still find a willing seller of 
TDRs). As such, allowing increased density through TDRs 
rather than a simple upzoning may decrease the likelihood of 
strong opposition to a proposal.  
Like the TDR programs in the Special Theater, Special 
Hudson Yards, and Special West Chelsea Districts, the East 
Midtown proposal includes an improvement fund. Developers 
contribute to these funds to either obtain the right to purchase 
TDRs or to obtain additional development capacity in lieu of, or 
in addition to, purchasing TDRs.134 These improvement funds 
serve to further the goals of the special district by providing 
infrastructure or other benefits. Essentially, these funds 
operate as an exaction for developers.135 Rather than allowing it 
to depend upon negotiations between a developer and the city, 
however, the funds standardize this exaction. Some of the 
programs also allow for an in-kind-contribution in place of a 
monetary contribution. The Hudson Yards District, for example, 
  
Transferable Development Rights: A Current Appraisal, 1 PROB. & PROP., Mar./Apr. 
1987, at 40, 42. 
 133 These programs are part of proposals that are subject to review through 
the ULURP process, which includes a public hearing. See UNIFORM LAND USE REVIEW 
PROCEDURE, supra note 101; see also N.Y.C. Dep’t of City Planning, West Chelsea 
Zoning Proposal, NYC.GOV, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/westchelsea/ 
westchelsea3a.shtml (last visited Oct. 16, 2012) (noting city council approval of three 
ULURP applications related to proposal); N.Y.C. Dep’t of City Planning, Hudson Yards 
Original Proposal as Adopted, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/hyards/proposal.shtml 
(last visited Oct. 16, 2012) (discussing ULURP applications). 
 134 See, e.g., N.Y.C., N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION § 81-744(a)(5) (2012) 
(discussing Theater Subdistrict Fund’s contribution requirement in conjunction with 
transfer by certification); id. § 98-35(c) (discussing High Line Improvement Fund); id. 
§ 98-262(c) (discussing increases in FAR in exchange for contributions to West Chelsea 
Affordable Housing Fund).  
 135 See generally Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American 
Land Use Regulation: Paying for Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REV. 177 (2006) 
(discussing history and evolving uses of exactions and development impact fees).  
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accepts the improvement of a granting site as a public park in 
lieu of a cash contribution.136 The High Line Improvement Fund 
allows a property owner to reduce her contribution if she 
provides structural remediation for the segment of the High 
Line above her property.137 The TDR programs accordingly 
regularize and standardize the price developers must pay to 
offset the impacts their developments will have on the 
community and again bring greater transparency to the process.  
C. Newer TDR Programs Have the Potential to Render 
TDRs More Valuable 
Finally, the newer programs strengthen the demand for 
TDRs. The West Chelsea, Hudson Yards, and proposed East 
Midtown programs are located in areas with significant demand 
for new residential and commercial space. These TDR programs 
operate in conjunction with broader policies that encourage and 
channel this demand.138 In the High Line area, for instance, the 
preservation of a unique urban resource has increased the area’s 
desirability. To further encourage the purchase of TDRs by 
certain recipient sites, the West Chelsea program requires 
developers to purchase TDRs before they can obtain additional 
FAR through the city’s inclusionary housing bonus program.139 In 
Hudson Yards, the city will only allow a developer to purchase 
TDRs from the Eastern Rail Yard after a private-market 
purchase of TDRs from the designated grantor sites.140 Similarly, 
the proposal for East Midtown will allow the largest sites to 
pursue a special permit for additional FAR only after they have 
already obtained the maximum FAR available through TDRs or 
through a contribution to the designated improvement fund.141 In 
contrast with the earlier zoning lot merger and landmark TDR 
programs, these newer programs both increase the value of 
TDRs to property owners burdened with restrictions and serve 
to further very specific planning goals. 
  
 136 N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION § 93-32(b). 
 137 Id. § 98-25. 
 138 See supra Part I.C (discussing programs). 
 139 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. 
 140 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 141 See East Midtown Study, supra note 54; see also Matt Chaban, How About 
Another Empire State Building or Two? City Outlines Mega Midtown East Rezoning, 
N.Y. OBSERVER, July 12, 2012, http://observer.com/2012/07/how-about-another-empire-
state-building-or-two-city-outlines-mega-midtown-east-rezoning/. 
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CONCLUSION 
New York City’s TDR programs have come a long way 
from the zoning lot mergers that approximated block-level 
density zoning. TDRs now play a starring role in some of the 
city’s most ambitious rezonings. This enhanced role, however, 
has been accompanied by careful restrictions on the sites that 
can receive the transfers. The creative tool that enabled New 
York City developers to seemingly escape restrictive zoning 
and build towering structures like the Trump World Tower142 
has been reined back into the confines of traditional zoning 
principles. While the latest evolution of TDR programs has 
advantages, the reduction in flexibility these newer programs 
impose will likely render them ineligible for “post-zoning” 
status, regardless of how that concept might be defined.  
  
 142 See Dunlap, supra note 27. 
